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Abstract—This paper investigates a secure wireless powered
integrated service system with full duplex self-energy recycling.
Specifically, an energy-constrained information transmitter (IT),
powered by a power station (PS) in a wireless fashion, broadcasts
two types of services to all users: a multicast service intended for
all users, and a confidential unicast service subscribed to by only
one user while protecting it from any other unsubscribed users
and an eavesdropper. Our goal is to jointly design the optimal
input covariance matrices for the energy beamforming, the mul-
ticast service, the confidential unicast service, and the artificial
noises from the PS and the IT, such that the secrecy-multicast
rate region (SMRR) is maximized subject to the transmit power
constraints. Due to the non-convexity of the SMRR maximization
(SMRRM) problem, we employ a semidefinite programming-
based two-level approach to solve this problem and find all of
its Pareto optimal points. In addition, we extend the SMRRM
problem to the imperfect channel state information case where
a worst-case SMRRM formulation is investigated. Moreover, we
exploit the optimized transmission strategies for the confidential
service and energy transfer by analyzing their own rank-one
profile. Finally, numerical results are provided to validate our
proposed schemes.
Index Terms—Wireless powered communication network,
physical layer security, full duplex, self-energy recycling, secrecy-
multicast performance tradeoff.
I. INTRODUCTION
Achieving high data rates and reliable transmission are key
objectives for the forthcoming fifth generation (5G) wireless
communication networks, which are motivated by a growing
consumers’ desire for high-quality multimedia wireless de-
vices (WDs) (such as 4k hand-held devices and 3D augmented
reality) [1]. In addition, high-quality transmission services
include: a multicast service, which is subscribed to by all
WDs, and a confidential unicast service, which is subscribed
to by a dedicated WD to prevent unauthorized access from
the unsubscribed WDs and the dedicated eavesdroppers. A
heuristic approach is to combine these two services into one
Z. Chu, P. Xiao, D. Mi, and R. Tafazolli are with Institute of Communi-
cation Systems, University of Surrey, Guildford GU2 7XH, United Kingdom.
(Email: zheng.chu@surrey.ac.uk; p.xiao@surrey.ac.uk; d.mi@surrey.ac.uk;
r.tafazolli@surrey.ac.uk)
F. Zhou is with the School of Information Engineering, Nanchang Univer-
sity, Nanchang 330031, China. (Email: zhoufuhui@ieee.org)
Z. Zhu is with the School of Information Engineering, Zhengzhou Univer-
sity, Zhengzhou 450001, China. (Email: zhuzhengyu6@gmail.com)
N. Al-Dhahir is with the Department of Electrical and Computer En-
gineering, University of Texas at Dallas, Dallas, TX 75080 USA (e-mail:
aldhahir@utdallas.edu).
integral service over one transmission time block, which is
defined as physical layer service integration (PHY-SI) [2],
[3]. In a PHY-SI system, these two coexisting services will
share the same radio resources by exploiting the physical
characteristics of wireless channels to significantly enhance
the spectral efficiency. However, in general, the confidential
and multicast (or public) services must be available to different
user groups to satisfy their own demands [3]. Thus, it is critical
to guarantee reliable transmission for the confidential unicast
service without sacrificing the quality of the multicast service.
As a result, physical layer multicasting and physical layer
security have received increasing attention in the literature
in recent years. In a multi-antenna multicasting system, the
transmit beamforming/precoding is typically designed to en-
sure efficient transmission of the common messages that
all receivers can decode to maximize the sum-rate while
maintaining the desired quality-of-service (QoS) level for all
users [4]–[6]. Due to the vulnerable nature of the wireless
broadcast channel to eavesdropping, physical layer security
techniques are becoming increasingly important. They achieve
high secrecy performance without secret key distribution and
management that may lead to security vulnerability in wireless
channels. The key feature of physical layer security is that
the channel for the legitimate user must be better than the
eavesdropper’s channel to guarantee a positive secrecy rate
that is defined as the mutual information difference between
the legitimate user’s channel and the eavesdropper’s channel
to the transmitter [7]. Recently, various secure transmission
strategies against eavesdropping have been developed based on
information-theoretical studies [8], [9], where multi-antenna
wiretap channels have been investigated to take advantage of
the additional degrees of freedom (DoF) and diversity gains.
The existing techniques in multi-antenna secrecy channels aim
to design the optimal transmit beamforming vectors, and to
introduce more interference to degrade the eavesdroppers’ link
(i.e., artificial noise (AN) and cooperative jammer (CJ)), thus
improving the achievable secrecy rate in multi-antenna secrecy
channels [10]–[13].
Due to the explosive growth of the high-data-rate multi-
media wireless services in 5G networks, more energies are
consumed in battery-powered devices to meet the demands
of various transmission services. How to prolong the lifetime
of the energy-limited devices is another crucial problem, and
one promising solution is microwave wireless energy transfer
(WET) [14]. In wireless-powered communication networks
(WPCNs), wireless transceivers are wirelessly charged by the
power transmitter [15], [16]. Unlike the traditional battery-
powered networks, WPCN can effectively reduce the oper-
ational cost to realize renewable charging without battery
replacement or recharging. In addition, the energy released by
the radio frequency signal in the WET network is adjustable
for providing a stable energy supply to satisfy different phys-
ical constraints and service requirements [16]. In WPCNs,
a well-known protocol, named “harvest-then-transmit” was
proposed in [17], where the wireless users are wirelessly
charged by a hybrid access-point (AP) in the downlink (DL),
and then they use the harvested energy to send the information
signal to the AP in the uplink (UL). Recently, a dedicated
WET network was proposed to deploy multiple power beacons
(PBs) near a wireless information transfer (WIT) network [18],
[19]. It is feasible to deploy the PBs densely to guarantee
network coverage due to the low cost of the PBs deployment
[20]. In [21], the power consumption model is evaluated to
quantify the energy efficiency (EE) of a wireless network,
which proposed an energy efficiency evaluation framework
(E3F) for a variety of base station (BS) models. It is applied to
quantify the EE performance of the downlink in a 3GPP LTE
radio access network. Integrating physical layer security with
WPCN can improve security and sustainable energy efficiency
in a multicasting system [1]. Multiple PBs are deployed to
provide wireless energy to support the secure multicasting
transmission, which solves the constrained energy problem and
guarantees secure transmissions simultaneously. However, the
above works mainly focus on the half-duplex (HD) systems
with wireless information and power transfer in orthogonal
time slots, which typically leads to low spectrum utilization.
As a result, full-duplex (FD) wireless systems have gained
increasing interest due to their potential to double the spectral
efficiency by simultaneous signal transmission and reception
over the same frequency band [22]–[26]. In [22], a full-duplex
wireless communication system was investigated, where same
band simultaneous bidirectional communication is achieved
via cancellation of the self-interfering signal. By exploiting
off-the-shelf multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) radios,
the experimental results characterize the suppression per-
formance of three self-interference cancellation mechanisms,
which combine different mixes of analog and digital cancella-
tion. In [23], a FD multiuser MIMO system was investigated,
where a BS bidirectionally communicates with multiple users
in the downlink (DL) and uplink (UL) channels on the same
system resources. The spectral efficiency (SE) and EE are
maximized by jointly designing the precoders in DL and UL.
A novel energy recycling single-antenna FD radio is devel-
oped, which includes a power divider and an energy harvester
added between the circulator and the receiver chain [24]. The
proposed self-energy recycling architecture can bring benefits
in terms of spectral efficiency and energy consumption. In
[25], [26], a novel multicarrier non-orthogonal multiple access
(MC-NOMA) system is investigated by considering a FD BS.
The optimal joint power and subcarrier allocation algorithm
is developed to maximize the weighted sum throughput [25],
while, the robustness and security performance is studied in
FD MISO MC-NOMA systems by taking into account the
imperfectness of the eavesdroppers’ channel state information
(CSI). Furthermore, the FD technique was introduced in
relay systems [27]–[29], where the energy-constrained relay
harvests energy with self-energy recycling, and forwards the
information signal to the destination node simultaneously.
Secure FD WPCN systems were investigated in [30], [31],
where the secrecy FD information and power transmission
was investigated with self-energy recycling. Particularly, in
[30], the optimal solution for the transmit beamforming vector
was derived in closed-form. A robust secure beamforming
scheme was developed based on the imperfect CSI case
[31]. In [32], the power control problems for in-band FD
EH wireless networks were formulated to minimize the sum
transmit power subject to the QoS constraint and maximize
the sum throughput. These two problems were solved via the
distributed power control schemes for controlling the uplink
transmit power levels by the users and the downlink energy
harvesting signal power by the hybrid BS.
Currently, various existing works focus on the PHY-SI
system. Specifically, the fundamental limit on the achievable
rate region in a PHY-SI system was investigated subject to
the secrecy constraint in [33]. The optimal integration of both
multicast and confidential services was derived in a discrete
memoryless broadcast channel. In [34]–[36], the results were
extended to the MIMO Gaussian broadcast case. Moreover,
the PHY-SI strategy has been applied to bidirectional relay
networks in [37], where the broadcast, multicast and con-
fidential services are integrated at a relay node to establish
bidirectional communications. The work in [38] deduced the
achievable secrecy rate region under channel uncertainty in
a compound broadcast channel, which represents a robust
PHY-SI transmit strategy. However, the aforementioned works
only tackle the PHY-SI problem from information theoretic
aspects, where the main goal is to derive capacity results or
to analyze coding schemes that achieve certain rate regions
[2]. To pave the road for practical implementation, it is
also important to investigate PHY-SI from signal processing
aspects, and identify the optimal transmit strategy for the
transmitted integrated services to maximize the achievable
secrecy rate regions [2], [3]. More importantly, it is necessary
to improve the spectral and energy utilization of the IT. Thus,
integrating the FD self-energy recycling with PHY-SI is a
practical and promising idea, where by harvesting energy from
the energy source and self-energy recycling, the FD IT serves
the integrated confidential unicast and multicast services to the
users. To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing work
that has investigated this integration. The above-mentioned
research gap motivates our development of the techniques
presented in this paper.
In this paper, we investigate a secure wireless powered
service integration system with FD self-energy recycling. We
formulate a secrecy-multicast rate region maximization (SM-
RRM) problem subject to the transmit power and the energy
harvesting constraints by incorporating perfect or imperfect
CSI. Our goal is to jointly design the optimal input covariance
matrices for the energy beamforming, the multicast service, the
confidential service, and the ANs from the PS and FD IT. The
contributions of this paper are highlighted as follows:
1) Secure wireless powered integrated service with FD self-
energy recycling: We consider a wireless powered in-
tegrated service system with FD self-energy recycling.
Specifically, a FD IT, powered by a PS, provides the
integrated multicast and confidential unicast service to
the users in the presence of a multi-antenna external
eavesdropper. The AN matrices are injected at the PS
and the FD IT to guarantee the confidential unicast
information transmission. The proposed system improves
the secrecy-multicast performance tradeoff by utilizing
wireless charge and self-energy recycling.
2) Optimized designs based on perfect or imperfect CSI:
Second, we develop a joint optimization scheme of AN-
embedded confidential unicast and multicast services
as well as an energy beamformer to maximize the
SMRR subject to transmit power and energy harvesting
constraints. Due to non-convexity of this optimization
problem, we first transform the SMRRM problem to
an equivalent scalar optimization problem for the per-
fect CSI case. Subsequently, we propose a semidefinite
programming (SDP) two-level optimization problem to
further recast it into a convex form. Specifically, the inner
level can be reformulated as an SDP, whereas the outer
level is a single-variable optimization problem, which can
be handled via a one-dimensional search. In addition,
we extend the SMRRM problem to the imperfect CSI
case, where the worst-case formulation is investigated. By
applying the quadratic matrix inequality (QMI) technique,
the worst-case SMRRM counterpart can also be recast as
the SDP.
3) Implementation efficiency analysis: Moreover, we inves-
tigate the feasibility of secrecy-multicast performance
tradeoff and present the optimal solution analysis for the
proposed scheme. First, we exploit the Pareto optimal
points for our formulated SMRRM problem. We also
characterize the rank-profile of the optimal solution to
the SMRRM problem, and derive the condition for the
optimal strategy of the confidential service. We show that
the reformulated problem yields a rank-one solution for
the optimal confidential covariance matrix. In addition,
we analyze the optimal solution of the reformulated prob-
lem with the optimal confidential strategy by constructing
a new solution. Furthermore, we show that the energy
beamforming matrix is rank-one such that the optimal
energy transfer strategy can be achieved.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
describes our system model. The optimization designs for the
perfect CSI scenario are presented in III. Section IV extends
our results to the imperfect CSI scenario. Numerical results are
provided in Section V and the paper is concluded in Section
VI. The summary of notations will be presented in Table I.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we consider a secure wireless powered
integrated service system as shown in Fig. 1, which consists
of one power station (PS), one information transmitter (IT),
K users, and one external eavesdropper. The PS is equipped
Fig. 1: A secure wireless powered FD integrated service system.
with NPS transmit antennas, and the IT consists of NIT + 1
antennas with NIT for integrated information service trans-
mission, and one for energy harvesting. All users are equipped
with a single antenna, and the eavesdropper is equipped with
NE antennas. The IT, powered by the stable wireless charge
from the PS, broadcasts the integrated services (i.e., multicast
and confidential unicast services) to all users. Meanwhile,
the IT adopts the FD scheme to collect energy from the
PS and self-interference, respectively. It is assumed that the
multicast service has been ordered by all users, and only user
1 further subscribed to the confidential service.1 To enhance
the security of the confidential service, both the PS and FD
IT inject ANs to interfere with the unauthorized users (i.e.,
potential eavesdroppers, user 2 to user K) and the dedicated
eavesdropper. A summary of notations for our system model
is provided in Table II. The received signals at the IT, user k,
and the eavesdropper are given by
yIT = h
Hv + hHzPS + h
H
SIx+ nIT , (1a)
yk=h
H
k x+g
H
k zPS+nk, ye=H
H
e x+G
H
e zPS+ne, (1b)
where v ∈ CNPS×1 and zPS ∈ C
NPS×1 are the energy
signal and the AN signal sent by the PS, respectively, which
are assumed to be pseudo-random with covariance matrices
V ∈ HNPS+ and ZPS ∈ H
NPS
+ , i.e., v ∼ CN (0,V)
and zPS ∼ CN (0,ZPS). In addition, x ∈ CNIT×1 is the
transmitted signal vector from the FD IT which consists of
three independent components, i.e., x = w0 + wp + zIT ,
where w0 ∈ CNIT×1 is the multicast message intended
for all users, wp ∈ C
NIT×1 is the confidential message
subscribed to by user 1, and zIT ∈ CNIT×1 is the AN
generated by the FD IT, where we assume w0 ∼ CN (0,W0),
wp ∼ CN (0,Wp), and zIT ∼ CN (0,ZIT ). Moreover,
nIT ∼ CN (0, σ2IT ), nk ∼ CN (0, σ
2
k), and ne ∼ CN (0, σ
2
eI)
are the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) signals at the
receive antenna of the FD IT, user k, and the eavesdropper,
respectively. Based on (1a), the amount of harvested energy by
1In this paper, it is assumed that only one user subscribes to the confidential
service during a single time block. In practice, this corresponds to the scenario
where the confidential service can be broadcast to all users in a round-robin
manner to enhance the reliability of the confidential service and to reduce the
operational complexity at the FD IT [3].
TABLE I: Notations
Notations Descriptions
(·)H Conjugate transpose
‖ ∗ ‖ Euclidean norm of a vector
Tr(·) Trace of a matrix
I Identity matrix with appropriate size
E{·} Statistical expectation of a random variable
(·)−1 Inverse of a matrix
A  0 A is a positive semidefinite matrix
[x]+ max{x, 0}
|A| Determinant of A
x ∼ CN (µ,Ω) x is a complex circular Gaussian random variable with mean µ and covariance Ω
TABLE II: Notations of System Model
Notations Descriptions Notations Descriptions
K Number of users h ∈ CNPS×1 Channel vector from PS to FD IT
NPS Number of transmit antennas at PS gk ∈ C
NPS×1 Channel vector from PS to user k
NIT Number of transmit antennas at FD IT Ge ∈ C
NPS×NE Channel matrix from PS to eavesdropper
NE Number of receive antennas at eavesdropper hk ∈ C
NIT ×1 Channel vector from FD IT to user k
K = {1, ...,K} Index set of all users He ∈ CNIT ×NE Channel matrix from FD IT to eavesdropper
K¯ = K/{1} Index set of unauthorized users hSI ∈ CNIT ×1 Self-loop channel vector.
FD IT2 is given by EIT = ξE
(
|hHv+hHzPS+hHSIx|
2
)
=
ξ
[
hH(V+ZPS)h+h
H
SI(W0+Wp+ZIT )hSI
]
, where 0 <
ξ ≤ 1 denotes the energy conversion efficiency at the FD
IT.3 Thus, the transmit power at the FD IT should satisfy
Tr(W0 +Wp+ZIT ) ≤ PIT +EIT , where PIT ≥ 0 denotes
the constant energy, which may represent the residual energy
at the FD IT from the information transmission at the previous
time block or energy obtained from the other power sources.
On the other hand, the achievable rates (i.e., multicast rate and
secrecy rate) at the FD IT are exploited according to (1b). The
multicast rate at user k is given by
Rcom,k=log2
(
1+
hHk W0hk
hHk (Wp+ZIT )hk+g
H
k ZPSgk+σ
2
k
)
, (2)
and the secrecy rate of user 1 can be written as
Rsec = [R1 −max{max
k∈K¯
Rk, Re}]
+, (3)
where
R1=log2
(
1+
hH1 Wph1
hH1 ZITh1+g
H
1 ZPSg1+σ
2
1
)
,
Rk=log2
(
1+
hHk Wphk
hHk ZIThk+g
H
k ZPSgk+σ
2
k
)
, k∈K¯,
Re=log2
∣∣∣I+(σ2eI+HHe ZITHe+GHe ZPSGe)−1HHe WpHe∣∣∣.
Note that the second term of (3) denotes the maximum
eavesdropping rate from the potential eavesdroppers (i.e., user
k, k ∈ K¯) and the external eavesdropper. It guarantees reliable
transmission for the secrecy unicast message intended to user
1. We define R¯com and R¯sec as the achievable rate regions
with the multicast and confidential services, respectively. Thus,
2Different from the works in [25], [26], where the FD BS typically
employed sophisticated SIC techniques, in our paper, the signal from the
transmit antenna of the FD IT enables the self-energy recycling. Specifically,
the loop energy that is employed for integrated information transmission by
the FD IT can be collected and reused in addition to the dedicated energy
powered by the PS.
3Note that the energy harvested from the noise at the FD IT is ignored
since it is usually small.
an achievable secrecy-multicast rate region is given as the set
of nonnegative rate region pairs (R¯com, R¯sec) satisfying the
following constraints [7], [34]:
R¯com≤min
k∈K
Rcom,k, (4a)
R¯sec≤R1−max{max
k∈K¯
Rk, Re}. (4b)
Remark 1: Note that the secrecy-multicast rate region (4)
reveals that all users first need to decode the common multicast
message by treating the confidential message as interference
(c.f. (2)). Then, the first user further subscribes to the secrecy
transmission link for its exclusive confidential service, in
which there is no interference from the multicast message. In
practice, the multicast service is typically known as regular
service, whereas the confidential service is known as the
premier service. The regular service must guarantee the signal
quality of the premier service, but not vice versa.
Remark 2: In this paper, we assume that a wireless-powered
FD IT performs the integrated confidential unicast and mul-
ticast service, which is termed as information/energy full-
duplexing [31]. Specifically, this FD IT can be powered by
the PS due to a limited-power supply. Unlike conventional in-
formation/information full-duplexing, which typically requires
sophisticated self-interference cancellation (SIC) techniques,
the signal leakage from the transmit antennas of the wireless
powered FD IT is in fact beneficial, since it enables self-
energy recycling, i.e., part of the energy (loop energy) that
is employed for information transmission by the FD IT can
be harvested and reused in addition to the dedicated energy
transmitted by the PS [30], [31], [39].
III. THE SMRRM PROBLEM BASED ON PERFECT CSI
In this section, we formulate the achievable SMRRM prob-
lem subject to the transmit power constraints at the PS and
the FD IT, which is based on the assumption that all CSIs are
available at the PS and the FD IT.4 This problem is a vector
optimization problem, with a cone K = K∗ = R2+, which is
given by
max
V,ZPS ,W0,Wp
ZIT ,R¯com,R¯sec
⋃
R
2
+
(R¯com, R¯sec), s.t. (4),
Tr(V + ZPS) ≤ PPS , (5a)
Tr(W0+Wp+ZIT )≤PIT
+ξ
[
hH(V+ZPS)h+h
H
SI(W0+Wp+ZIT )hSI
]
, (5b)
([V]n,n+[ZPS ]n,n)≤p
n
PS , ∀n ∈ {1, ..., NPS}, (5c)
([W0]m,m+[Wp]m,m+[ZIT ]m,m)≤p
m
IT ,
∀m ∈ {1, ..., NIT}, (5d)
V,ZPS ,W0,Wp,ZIT  0, (5e)
where PPS is the maximum available transmit power at the
PS, while pnPS and p
m
IT denote the transmit power limits of the
n-th and m-th antenna at the PS and the FD IT, respectively.
Note that the constraints (5c) and (5d) denote the per-antenna
power constraints. Problem (5) is a bi-objective optimization
problem, where the two objectives are R¯com and R¯sec. The
basic idea to solve this problem is to maximize their weighted
sum by searching for the weight factor. However, this method
may not find all of the Pareto optimal points [41].5 In this
paper, we develop a novel approach to find all Pareto optimal
points of (5). Specifically, we first fix the variable R¯com as a
constant such that (5) is reduced to the maximization of R¯sec.
Thus, problem (5) can be simplified into the following secrecy
rate maximization (SRM) problem
f opt(R¯com) = max
V,ZPS
W0,Wp,ZIT
R1−max{max
k∈K¯
Rk, Re},
s.t. (4a), (5a), (5b), (5e),
Tr [Ξn(V + ZPS)] ≤ p
n
PS , n ∈ {1, ..., NPS}, (6a)
Tr [Λm(W0 +Wp + ZIT )] ≤ p
m
IT , m ∈ {1, ..., NIT}, (6b)
where Ξn = rnr
H
n and Λm = rmr
H
m are the given antenna
design parameters to adjust each antenna power budget. For
instance, rn is the n-th unit vector, i.e., [rn]i = 1, for n = i,
and [rn]j = 0, for n 6= i. The specific applications of per-
antenna power constraints have been already described in [11],
[12]. From (6), it follows that R¯com is fixed as a pre-defined
requirement of the multicast rate. When R¯com = 0, problem
4In this paper, it is first assumed that perfect CSI is available on the links
from the PS and the FD IT. This is due to the fact that each user in this
WPCN PHY-SI network has the registration for subscribing to the multicast
service. During this registration or lease renewal, these users are required to
feedback their own CSI without noise, which could be achieved by using
a low-rate transmission with suitable quantization schemes [3]. In addition,
the CSIs of the eavesdropper are assumed to be perfectly known at the PS
and the FD IT, which can be achieved through different methods such as the
local oscillator power leakage from the eavesdropper receiver’s RF frontend
[40]. Nonetheless, considering the impact of channel uncertainty, we will also
investigate the case of imperfect CSI at the PS and the FD IT in Section IV.
5Note that different multi-objective problems were developed in [42],
[43], where a weighted Tchebycheff method was employed for investigating
the tradeoff between multi-objective functions. However, this method solves
multiple optimization problems which is time consuming. In addition, this
method may not be applicable to our work, since it would yield a nonconvex
scalar optimization problem if used to solve our problem such that it may not
find the complete Pareto optimal set [3].
(6) becomes a conventional AN-aided SRM problem for a
secure WPCN system with FD self-recycling, similar to [31].
Note that the secrecy transmission will be terminated provided
that R¯com is set to an upper bound R¯
max
com, which is achieved
by solving the following problem
R¯maxcom = arg max
W00
min
k∈K
log2
(
1 +
hHk W0hk
σ2k
)
, (7a)
s.t. Tr[(I−ξhSIh
H
SI)W0] ≤ PIT+ξPPS‖h‖
2,
Tr [ΛmW0]≤p
m
IT , m ∈ {1, ..., NIT}. (7b)
It can be easily verified that the constraints in (7b) are obtained
from the constraints (5b) and (6b), respectively. From (7),
R¯maxcom can be interpreted as the multicast capacity, which is
an upper bound on R¯com. It is easily verified that (7) can be
solved by using an SDP reformulation [41]. Now, a question
arises whether problem (6) can guarantee a complete inclusion
of the Pareto optimal solutions of (5).
Theorem 1: The achievable rate pair (R¯com, f(R¯com)) is
a Pareto optimal point of (5), and all Pareto optimal points
of (5) can be achieved by solving problem (6) with different
R¯com lying within the interval [0, R¯
max
com].
Proof: This proof is similar to the proof of [3, Theorem
1]. We omit the details of this proof due to space limitation.
By applying Theorem 1, we can claim that the Pareto optimal
solution of (5) can be achieved by solving problem (6) with
R¯com ∈ [0, R¯maxcom]. Next, we will exploit the optimal solution
of problem (6).
A. Solution of The Optimization Problem (6)
Problem (6) is still nonconvex. In order to address this issue,
we rewrite (6) as
f opt(R¯com)= max
V,ZPS ,W0
Wp,ZIT ,α≥1
R1−log2(α)
s.t.max
k∈K¯
log2
(
1+
hHk Wphk
hHk ZIThk+g
H
k ZPSgk+σ
2
k
)
≤ log2(α),
(8a)
log2
∣∣∣I+(σ2eI+HHe ZITHe+GHe ZPSGe)−1HHe WpHe∣∣∣
≤ log2(α), (8b)
hHk
[
W0−R¯
′
com(Wp+ZIT )
]
hk−R¯
′
comg
H
k ZPSgk
−R¯
′
comσ
2
k≥0, ∀k ∈ K (8c)
(5a), (5b), (6a), (6b), (5e).
where α is a slack variable which can be interpreted as an
upper bound on the eavesdropping rate constraints (8a) and
(8b). Since problem (8) is still intractable, we treat it as a two-
level optimization problem where the inner and outer levels
are defined, respectively, as follows
1) Inner level: Since log2(·) is monotonically increasing, prob-
lem (8) can be equivalently recast as the following inner
level problem for given α ≥ 1,
gopt(R¯
′
com, α)= max
V,ZPS ,W0
Wp,ZIT
hH1 (Wp+ZIT )h1+g
H
1 ZPSg1+σ
2
1
α(hH1 ZITh1+g
H
1 ZPSg1+σ
2
1)
s.t. (8a), (8b), (8c), (5a), (5b), (6a), (6b), (5e), (9)
where R¯
′
com = 2
R¯com − 1.
2) Outer level:
g˜opt(R¯
′
com) = max
α∈[αmin,αmax]
gopt(R¯
′
com, α), (10)
where αmin and αmax are lower and upper bounds
on the variable α determined as αmin = 1 ≤ 1 +
hH1 Wph1
h1ZITh1+gH1 ZPSg1+σ
2
1
≤1+h
H
1 Wph1
σ2
1
=1+
‖h1‖
2
∑NIT
m=1 p
m
IT
σ2
1
=
αmax. Since (10) is a single-variable optimization problem,
its optimal solution can be found via one-dimension search
over α.
With the optimal values gopt(R¯
′
com, α) and g˜
opt(R¯
′
com) of prob-
lems (9), and (10), respectively, the optimal value of problem
(8) can be computed as f opt(R¯
′
com) = log2(g˜
opt(R¯
′
com)). The
inner problem (9) is still nonconvex due to the convexity of
its objective function as well as the constraints (8a) and (8b).
To circumvent this issue, we first reformulate the constraints
(8a) and (8b) as
(8a)⇒ hHk [Wp−(α−1)ZIT ]hk−(α−1)g
H
k ZPSgk
−(α−1)σ2k≤0, k ∈ K¯, (11a)
(8b)⇒ (α−1)
(
σ2eI+H
H
e ZITHe+G
H
e ZPSGe
)
HHe WpHe. (11b)
Note that the constraints (8b) and (11b) are equivalent when
α > 1 and rank(Wp) ≤ 1 [11]. Thus, problem (9) can be
equivalently modified as
gopt(R¯
′
com, α)= max
V,ZPS,W0
Wp,ZIT
hH1 (Wp+ZIT )h1+g
H
1 ZPSg1+σ
2
1
α
(
hH1 ZITh1+g
H
1 ZPSg1+σ
2
1
)
(12a)
s.t. (11a), (11b), (8c), (5a), (5b), (6a), (6b), (5e). (12b)
Note that problem (12) is a quasi-convex problem, where its
globally optimal solution can be found by the bi-section search
method [41]. However, such a method will require solving a
sequence of SDPs. Therefore, it is preferred to solve (12) by
reformulating it as a convex problem. Here we explore a more
efficient approach by applying the following Chanres-Cooper
transformation [44], of the transmit covariance matrices,
V=
V˜
τ
,ZPS=
Z˜PS
τ
,W0=
W˜0
τ
,Wp=
W˜p
τ
,ZIT=
Z˜IT
τ
, τ >0.
(13)
Thus, problem (12) can be reformulated as the following SDP
problem,
g
opt(R¯
′
com, α)= max
V˜,Z˜PS ,W˜0
W˜p,Z˜IT ,τ
h
H
1 (W˜p+Z˜IT )h1+g
H
1 Z˜PSg1+σ
2
1τ
(14a)
s.t. α(τσ21 + h
H
1 Z˜ITh1 + g
H
1 Z˜PSg1) = 1, (14b)
h
H
k
[
W˜p−(α−1)Z˜IT
]
hk−(α−1)g
H
k Z˜PSgk
−(α−1)σ2kτ≤0, k ∈ K¯,
(α−1)
(
σ
2
eτI+H
H
e Z˜ITHe+G
H
e Z˜PSGe
)
H
H
e W˜pHe,
h
H
k
[
W˜0−R¯
′
com(W˜p+Z˜IT )
]
hk−R¯
′
comg
H
k Z˜PSgk
−R¯
′
comσ
2
kτ≥0,
Tr(W˜0+W˜p+Z˜IT ) ≤ τPIT
+ξ
[
h
H(V˜+Z˜PS)h+h
H
SI(W˜0+W˜p+Z˜IT )hSI
]
,
Tr(V˜+Z˜PS)≤τPPS, V˜, Z˜PS ,W˜0,W˜p, Z˜IT  0, τ >0.
Tr
[
Ξn(V˜+Z˜PS)
]
≤τp
n
PS,Tr
[
Λm(W˜0+W˜p+Z˜IT )
]
≤τp
m
IT .
Note that the above transformation is motivated by the fact
that the fractional objective function in (12a) is transformed
to the linear objective function in (14a). In addition, this trans-
formation fixes the denominator of (12a) which leads to the
constraint in (14b). The proof of the equivalence of problems
(12) and (14) can be obtained by following the argument in
[10]. It is easily observed that (14) is an SDP, which can be
efficiently solved to achieve the global optimization solution
by using a convex optimization solver, such as CVX [45]. By
exploiting problem (14), the optimal solution of (12) can be
found through the relation (13) and its optimal value can be
achieved for a given α. Then, we adopt a one-dimensional
search over α to solve the outer-level problem in (10), where
the golden search can be employed to find the optimal α to
achieve the maximum gopt(R¯
′
com). The optimal value of prob-
lem (8) can be computed as f opt(R¯
′
com) = log2(g˜
opt(R¯
′
com))
such that all Pareto optimal points of problem (5) are achieved.
Note that our work can be extended to the multiple external
eavesdroppers scenario, and the same algorithm can be applied
to solve the SMRRM problem. These details are omitted to
conserve space.
B. Rank Revelation Analysis
In the previous section, we adopted the SDP reformulation
to solve the SMRRM problem (6). However, by solving its
reformulated problem (12) numerically, there is generally no
guarantee that the optimal solution of (14) would satisfy the
rank-one condition for multicast service (i.e.,W0) and the AN
matrices (i.e., ZPS and ZIT ). However, the rank-one optimal
solution for the confidential service (i.e., Wp) and the energy
beamforming matrix (i.e., V) can be guaranteed. Hence, in
this subsection, we will exploit the structure of the optimal
solution in problem (12). First, we denote the optimal objective
value of (12) as g¯(R¯
′
com, α) for any given feasible α. It can
be verified that (12) has an identical optimal solution to the
following power minimization problem [3], [11], [31], which
is given by
min
V,ZPS
W0,Wp,ZIT
Tr(W0 +Wp + ZIT ),
s.t. (11a), (11b), (8c), (5a), (5b), (6a), (6b), (5e), (15a)
hH1 (Wp+ZIT )h1+g
H
1 ZPSg1+σ
2
1
α
(
hH1 ZITh1+g
H
1 ZPSg1+σ
2
1
) ≥ g¯opt(R¯′com, α). (15b)
Thus, the remaining part is to characterize the rank profile of
problem (15). According to (15b), we have
hH1 [Wp + α1ZIT ]h1 − α1g
H
1 ZPSg1 − α1σ
2
1 ≥ 0, (16)
where α1 = 1 − αg¯(R¯
′
com, α). Next, the
Lagrange dual function of (15) can be expressed
as (17) on the top of next page, where Ω =
{V,ZPS ,W0,Wp,ZIT , λk, µk, δ, γ, ̺n, ϕm,A,B,C,D,F,X},
A  0, B  0, C  0, D  0, F  0, X  0, λk ≥ 0,
µk ≥ 0, δ ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0, ̺n ≥ 0, and ϕm ≥ 0 are dual variables
pertaining to the primary constraints in (15).
Theorem 2: Provided that the optimization problem (12)
is feasible for any given α, the optimal solution of the
confidential service (i.e., Wp) satisfies rank(Wp) ≤ 1 when
I− ξhSISI
H  0 holds. Moreover, provided that the energy
beamforming matrix condition V 6= 0 holds, it always yields
a rank-one solution, i.e., rank(V) ≤ 1.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A.
Now, a natural question arises on how to tackle a more general
scenario where the optimal solution of problem (15), denoted
as (V∗, Z∗PS ,W
∗
0 ,W
∗
p, Z
∗
IT ), yields rank(W
∗
p) ≥ 1. For this
scenario, we construct a new solution set for problem (15)
with the optimal solution of the confidential service.
Theorem 3: Suppose that the optimal solution of problem
(15) is denoted as (V∗, Z∗PS , W
∗
0, W
∗
p, Z
∗
IT ) such that
rank(Wp) > 1. Then, there exists a feasible solution of
(15), denoted as (V˜∗, Z˜∗PS ,W˜
∗
0,W˜
∗
p, Z˜
∗
IT ), which achieves
the same objective value with (V∗,Z∗PS ,W
∗
0,W
∗
p,Z
∗
IT ) with
rank(W˜∗p) = 1.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B.
IV. THE WORST-CASE SMRRM PROBLEM BASED ON
IMPERFECT CSI
In the previous section, we solved the SMRRM problem
based on the assumption that the CSIs are perfectly available
at the PS and IT. However, there are practical challenges in
obtaining the CSIs due to the channel estimation mismatch and
channel quantization errors [3], [12]. Hence, in this section,
we investigate the worst-case SMRRM problem based on the
imperfect CSI case. By incorporating the channel uncertain-
ties, this optimization framework can be reformulated into an
SDP.
A. Channel Uncertainty Model
In this subsection, we consider a more general scenario
where the PS and FD IT have imperfect CSI of the links
between the IT and all users, the PS and all users, the FD IT
and the eavesdropper, as well as the PS and the eavesdropper,
respectively. We express the actual channels of these links
as the sum of their associated estimates plus the channel
estimation errors, i.e.,
S1,k={S1,k|hk= h¯k+e1,k, e
H
1,ke1,k≤ε
2
1,k, ∀k∈K},
S2,k={S2,k|gk= g¯k+e2,k, e
H
2,ke2,k≤ε
2
2,k, ∀k∈K},
Se,1={Se,1|He=H¯e+E1,Tr(E1E
H
1 )≤ε
2
e,1},
Se,2={Se,2|Ge=G¯e+E2,Tr(E2E
H
2 )≤ε
2
e,2},
where h¯k, g¯k, He, and Ge are the estimated versions of hk,
gk, He, and Ge, respectively, while, e1,k, e2,k, E1, and E2
represent the associated channel estimation errors which are
based on the ellipsoidal channel error models [11]–[13], [31].
B. The Worst-Case Robust SMRRM
According to the channel uncertainty model in Section
IV-A, the worst-case secrecy rate region can be expressed as
follows
R¯com,wc≤min
k∈K
min
hk∈S1,k
gk∈S2,k
Rcom,k=Rcom,wc, (19a)
R¯sec,wc≤ min
h1∈S1,1
g1∈S2,1
R1−max{max
k∈K¯
max
hk∈S1,k
gk∈S2,k
Rk, max
He∈Se,1
gk∈Se,2
Re}=Rsec,wc.
(19b)
To develop robust designs for the energy matrix V, the
multicast beamforming matrix W0, the confidential matrix
Wp, and the AN matrices (ZPS and ZIT ), we formulate the
following worst-case SMRRM problem,
max
V,ZPS ,W0
Wp,ZIT ,R¯com,R¯sec
⋃
R
2
+
(R¯com,wc, R¯sec,wc),
s.t. (19a), (19b), (5a), (5b), (6a), (6b), (5e). (20)
Problem (20) is not convex due to channel uncertainties, which
cannot be solved directly. To circumvent this issue, we recast
(20) into a standard scalar optimization problem similar to
the procedure shown in Section III. By fixing the variable
R¯com,wc ≥ 0, we modify problem (20) as follows
f optwc(R¯com,wc)= max
V,ZPS
W0,Wp,ZIT
Rsec,wc,
s.t. (19a), (5a), (5b), (6a), (6b), (5e). (21)
From (21), R¯com,wc is a pre-defined minimum achievable
worst-case multicast rate, and when R¯com = 0, (21) is a
conventional worst-case SRM problem for a secure wireless
powered FD energy recycle system. Similar to (7), the max-
imum value of R¯com,wc, denoted by R¯
max
com,wc, is attained by
solving the following problem
R¯maxcom,wc=max
W00
min
hk∈S1,k
log2
(
1+
hHk W0hk
σ2k
)
, s.t. (7b), (22)
where R¯maxcom,wc is the largest achievable worst-case multicast
rate. Problem (22) can be easily reformulated into an SDP
and can be solved by using CVX [45]. Note that the rate
pair (R¯com,wc, f
opt
wc(R¯com)) is a Pareto optimal point of the
problem (21), and all Pareto optimal points of (21) can be
achieved with R¯com,wc ∈ [0, R¯maxcom,wc].
L(Ω)=Tr(W0)+Tr(Wp)+Tr(ZIT )−Tr(AV)−Tr(BZPS)−Tr(CW0)−Tr(DWp)−Tr(FZIT )
−λ1[h
H
1 [Wp+α1ZIT ]h1−α1g
H
1 ZPSg1−α1σ
2
1 ]+
K∑
k=2
λk[h
H
k [Wp−(α−1)ZIT ]hk−(α−1)g
H
k ZPSgk
−(α−1)σ2k]−Tr[X((α−1)
(
σ2eI+H
H
e ZITHe+G
H
e ZPSGe
)
−HHe WpHe)]−
K∑
k=1
µk
[
hHk [W0
−R¯
′
com(Wp+ZIT )]hk−R¯
′
comg
H
k ZPSgk−R¯
′
comσ
2
k
]
+δ
[
Tr
[(
I−ξhSIh
H
SI
)
(W0+Wp+ZIT )
]
−PIT−ξTr[hh
H(V + ZPS)]
]
+γ[Tr(V+ZPS)−PPS ]+
NPS∑
n=1
̺n [Tr [Ξn(V+ZPS)]−p
n
PS]
+
NIT∑
m=1
ϕm [Tr [Λm(W0+Wp+ZIT )]−p
m
IT ] , (17)
Next, we develop a tractable reformulation of problem (21).
Similar to Section III, we employ a slack variable α2 such
that (21) can be modified as (23) on the top of next page,
where R¯
′
com,wc = 2
R¯com,wc − 1. Problem (23) is still non-
convex, and challenging to solve. Similar to Section III, we
follow a two-level optimization approach to solve (23). First,
problem (23) is reformulated as a single-variable optimization
problem over α2, and its optimal solution can be found via
one-dimensional search (i.e., golden search) over the interval
[α2,min, α2,max]. The lower and upper bounds, denoted by,
α2,min and α2,max, respectively, can be easily determined to
be α2,min = 1 ≤ α2 ≤ 1 + minh1∈S1,1
1
σ2
1
hH1 Wph1 ≤ 1 +
1
σ2
1
(‖h¯1‖ − ε1,1)2
∑NIT
m=1 p
m
IT = α2,max Thus, the outer level
problem is given by
g˜optwc(R¯
′
com,wc) = max
α2
goptwc(R¯
′
com,wc, α2),
s.t. α2,min ≤ α2 ≤ α2,max, (24)
where f
opt
wc(R¯
′
com,wc) = log2 g˜
opt(R¯
′
com,wc), and
g
opt
wc(R¯
′
com,wc, α2) can be written as
max
V,ZPS
W0,Wp,ZIT
min
h1∈S1,1
g1∈S2,1
hH1 (Wp+ZIT )h1+g
H
1 ZPSg1+σ
2
1
α2(hH1 ZITh1+g
H
1 ZPSg1+σ
2
1)
(25a)
s.t. (23a), (23b), (23c), (5a), (5b), (6a), (6b), (5e). (25b)
In the following, we reformulate problem (25) for a given
α2. The challenge of dealing with (25) lies in the existence
of channel uncertainties in the objective function (25a), as
well as the constraints (23a), (23b), and (23c). Now, we first
employ the S-Procedure in [41] and [46, Theorem 3.5] such
that the constraints (23c) and (23a) can be reformulated into
the linear matrix inequalities (LMI), i.e., (26a) and (26b) on
the top of next page, respectively, where {λ¯k, γ¯k, β¯k, θ¯k≥ 0}
are the auxiliary optimization variables, sk = h¯
H
k A¯1h¯k −
g¯Hk A¯2g¯k−R¯
′
com,wcσ
2
k−λ¯kε
2
1,k−γ¯k, R¯
′
com,wc = 2
R¯com,wc−1,
A¯1 =W0−R¯
′
com,wc(Wp+ZIT ), A¯2 = R¯
′
com,wcZPS , B¯1 =
Wp−(α2−1)ZIT , B¯2 = (α2−1)ZPS , and tk = −h¯Hk B¯1h¯k+
g¯Hk B¯2g¯k+(α2−1)σ
2
k−β¯kε
2
1,k− θ¯k. To proceed, by exploiting
[46, Theorem 3.3 and 3.5] the constraint (23b) is recast as (27)
on the top of next page, where te = H¯
H
e C¯1H¯e+G¯
H
e C¯2G¯e+
[
(α2 − 1)σ2e − δ¯e − η¯e
]
INE , C¯1 = (α2 − 1)ZIT −Wp, and
C¯2 = (α2 − 1)ZPS . Thus, problem (25) can be reformulated
as
max
Ω
min
h1∈S1,1
g1∈S2,1
hH1 (Wp+ZIT )h1+g
H
1 ZPSg1+σ
2
1
α2(hH1 ZITh1+g
H
1 ZPSg1+σ
2
1)
(28a)
s.t. (5a), (5b), (6a), (6b), (5e), (26a), (26b), (27),
{V,ZPS ,W0,Wp,ZIT , λ¯k, γ¯k, β¯k, θ¯k, δ¯e, η¯e} ∈ Ω. (28b)
With the optimal value of g
opt
wc(R¯
′
com,wc, α2) of problem (28)
computed, the optimal f
opt
wc(R¯
′
com,wc) of problem (23) can be
found via f¯
opt
wc(R¯
′
com,wc) = log2
[
g˜
opt
wc(R¯
′
com,wc)
]
. To proceed,
it is observed that problem (28) is still nonconvex. Thus, we
will show that (28) is a quasi-convex optimization problem
such that its globally optimal solution can be efficiently found
via the bisection method [41].
Theorem 4: The problem (28) is a quasi-convex problem.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C.
By applying Theorem 4, we adopt the bi-section method
to search α˜ to obtain the globally optimal solution of the
problem (28). However, such a method would require solving
a sequence of SDPs, which leads to a very high compu-
tational complexity. To reduce complexity, we consider a
suboptimal resource allocation scheme to reformulate problem
(28) in a more efficient manner by employing the Charnes-
Cooper transformation. By introducing τ¯ > 0 and defining
V = Vˆ
τ¯
, ZPS =
ZˆPS
τ¯
, W0 =
Wˆ0
τ¯
, Wp =
Wˆp
τ¯
, ZPS =
ZˆPS
τ¯
, λ¯k =
λˆk
τ¯
, γ¯k =
γˆk
τ¯
, ∀k ∈ K, β¯k =
βˆk
τ¯
, θ¯k =
γˆk
τ¯
, ∀k ∈ K¯, δ¯e ≥ 0, η¯e ≥ 0, problem (28) can be
reformulated as (29) shown on the top of next page, where
Aˆ1 = Wˆ0 − R¯
′
com,wc(Wˆp + ZˆIT ), Aˆ2 = R¯
′
com,wcZˆIT ,
Bˆ1 = Wˆp − (α2 − 1)ZˆIT , Bˆ2 = (α2 − 1)ZˆPS , Cˆ1 =
(α2 − 1)ZˆIT − Wˆp, Cˆ2 = (α2 − 1)ZˆPS , D1 = Wˆp + ZˆIT ,
s1 = h¯
H
1 D1h¯1 + g¯
H
1 ZPS g¯1 + τ¯σ
2
1 − t − βˆ1ε
2
1,1 − ηˆ1, and
s2 = −h¯H1 ZIT − g¯
H
1 ZPS g¯1− τ¯σ
2
1+
1
α2
− βˆ11ε21,1− ηˆ11. Prob-
lem (29) is a standard SDP, which can be efficiently solved
by using the interior-point method [41]. It is observed that
(29) can significantly reduce the computational complexity
compared with the globally optimal solution. In addition, this
f optwc(R¯
′
com,wc)= max
V,ZPS,W0
Wp,ZIT ,α2
min
h1∈S1,1
g1∈S2,1
log2
(
hH1 (Wp + ZIT )h1+g
H
1 ZPSg1+σ
2
1
α2(hH1 ZITh1+g
H
1 ZPSg1+σ
2
1)
)
,
s.t. (5a), (5b), (6a), (6b), (5e),
max
k∈K¯
max
hk∈S1,k
gk∈S2,k
log2
(
1 +
hHk Wphk
hHk ZIThk + g
H
k ZPSgk + σ
2
k
)
≤ log2(α2), (23a)
max
He∈Se,1
Ge∈Se,2
log2
∣∣∣I+ (σ2eI+HHe ZITHe +GHe ZPSGe)−1HHe WpHe∣∣∣ ≤ log2(α2), (23b)
hHk
(
W0 − R¯
′
com,wc(Wp + ZIT )
)
hk − R¯
′
com,wcg
H
k ZPSgk − R¯
′
com,wcσ
2
k ≥ 0. (23c)
Sk(W0,Wp,ZIT ,ZPS , λ¯k, γ¯k)=

 λ¯kINIT +A¯1 A¯1h¯k 0NIT×NPSh¯Hk A¯1 sk −g¯Hk A¯2
0NPS×NIT −A¯2g¯k −A¯2+
γ¯k
ε2
2,k
INPS

0, ∀k∈K. (26a)
Tk(Wp,ZIT ,ZPS , β¯k, θ¯k)=


β¯kINIT −B¯1 −B¯1g¯k 0NIT×NPS
−h¯Hk B¯1 tk g¯
H
k B¯2
0NPS×NIT B¯2g¯k B¯2+
θ¯k
ε2
2,k
INPS

0, ∀k ∈ K¯, (26b)
Te(Wp,ZIT ,ZPS , δ¯e, η¯e)=


δ¯e
ε2e,1
INIT +C¯1 C¯1H¯e 0NIT×NPS
H¯He C¯1 te G¯
H
e C¯2
0NPS×NT C¯2G¯e C¯2+
η¯e
ε2
2,e
INPS

0, δ¯e≥0, η¯e≥0. (27)
max
Vˆ,ZˆPS ,Wˆ0Wˆp,ZˆIT
λˆk,γˆk,βˆk,θˆk,δˆe,ηˆe,τ¯
t, s.t. Tr(Vˆ + ZˆPS) ≤ τ¯PPS , Vˆ, ZˆPS , Wˆ0, Wˆp, ZˆIT  0,
Tr(Wˆ0 + Wˆp + ZˆIT ) ≤ τ¯PIT + ξ
[
hH(Vˆ + ZˆPS)h+ h
H
SI(Wˆ0 + Wˆp + ZˆIT )hSI
]
,
Tr
[
Ξn(Vˆ + ZˆPS)
]
≤ τ¯ pnPS , Tr
[
Λm(Wˆ0 + Wˆp + ZˆIT )
]
≤ τ¯pmIT ,



βˆ1INIT +D1 D1h¯1 0NIT×NPS
h¯H1 D1 s1 g¯
H
1 ZˆPS
0NPS×NIT ZˆPS g¯1 ZˆPS+
ηˆ1
ε2
2,1
INPS

0,
βˆ1≥0, ηˆ1≥0,




βˆ11INIT −ZˆIT −ZˆIT h¯1 0NIT×NPS
−h¯H1 ZIT s2 −g¯
H
1 ZPS
0NPS×NIT −ZˆPS g¯1 −ZˆPS+
ηˆ11
ε2
2,1
INPS

0,
βˆ11 ≥ 0, ηˆ11 ≥ 0.{
Sk(Wˆ0,Wˆp, ZˆIT , ZˆPS , λˆk, γˆk)0,
λˆk ≥ 0, γˆk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K,
{
Tk(Wˆp, ZˆIT , ZˆPS , βˆk, θˆk)0,
βˆk≥0, θˆk≥0, ∀k ∈ K¯,{
Te(Wˆp, ZˆIT , ZˆPS , δˆe, ηˆe)0,
δˆe≥0, ηˆe ≥ 0.
(29)
scheme can asymptotically achieve global optimality at the
higher multicast rate region. This is due to the fact that the
power allocation for the ANs (i.e., ZIT and ZPS) gradually
diminishes with the increase of the multicast rate. Note that
problem (29) provides a lower bound on the globally optimal
solution to (35) [3].
C. Rank Revelation Analysis
In the previous subsection, we proposed globally optimal
and sub-optimal solutions to the worst-case SMRRM problem
(20). Now, a natural question arises whether the rank char-
acteristics shown in Section III-B apply to the imperfect CSI
case. This question is answered by the following theorem:
Theorem 5: Provided that the optimization problem (28)
is feasible for any given α, the optimal solution of the
confidential service (i.e., Wp) satisfies rank(Wp) ≤ 1 when
I− ξhSISI
H  0 holds. Moreover, provided that the energy
beamforming matrix condition V 6= 0 holds, we always have
rank(V) ≤ 1.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix D.
Remark 3: Suppose that the optimal solution to problem
(37), denoted as (V∗,Z∗PS ,W
∗
0,W
∗
p,ZIT ) with rank(W
∗
p) >
1, it is not always possible to construct a solution with the
optimal confidential transmission strategy similar to Theorem
3. Fortunately, we are able to follow the work in [47, Theorem
1] to prove that problem (37) yields the optimal confidential
transmission strategy by exploiting its rank-one profile. How-
ever, we omit the details of this proof due to space limitation.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present simulation results to demonstrate
the performance of our proposed schemes. We consider a
secure wireless powered FD integrated information service
system where the PS is equipped with six transmit antennas
(NPS = 6), the FD IT has one receive antenna and six
transmit antennas (NIT = 6), an eavesdropper with three
receive antennas (NE = 3), and four single-antenna users
(K = 4). As in [48], we assume that the channel models
include both large-scale, i.e., path loss, and small-scale fading,
i.e., multi-path fading. Particularly, the simplified large-scale
fading model can be expressed as D = A0
(
d
dr
)−α
, ∀d ≥ dr,
where A0 is a constant set to 1, α is the path loss exponent set
to 2.7, dr is a reference distance set to 1 meter, and d denotes
the propagation distance from the transmitter to the receiver. 6
On the other hand, the small-scale fading channel coefficients
are assumed to be the Rayleigh fading component which obeys
CN (0, DI). Specifically, the channel vector h from the PS to
the FD IT suffers from Rician fading7 while the other channel
coefficients follow the Rayleigh distribution [48]. Following
[43], the coefficients of the self-loop channel vector hSI are
modelled as i.i.d. Rician random variables with a Rician factor
of 5 dB. The maximum available power at the PS (i.e., PPS)
and the residual power at the FD IT (i.e., PIT ) are set to
be 30 dBm and 0 dBm, respectively. The maximum transmit
power per-antenna at the PS and the FD IT are set to be pnPS =
pmIT = 30 dBm, ∀n = {1, ..., NPS}, ∀m = {1, ..., NIT}
according to [12]. For simplicity, we assume that the noise
powers at all receivers are equal to σ2k = σ
2
e = −50 dBm,
and the energy transfer efficiency is set to be ξ = 0.8. To
highlight the performance tradeoffs of our proposed scheme,
in our simulations, we compare our proposed scheme with the
following five baseline schemes
1) Baseline 1: We assume that the FD IT transmits no-AN
aided integrated service, which means that only the AN
6This propagation distance includes the PS to the IT (i.e., 5 meters), the
PS to users (i.e., 20 meters), the PS to the eavesdropper (i.e., 10 meters),
the IT to the users (i.e., 15 meters) and the IT to the eavesdropper (i.e.,
5 meters). Note that the transmit power consumption increases, while the
secrecy rate decreases as the distance between PS and IT increases [1]. In
this paper, it may not be guaranteed to harvest sufficient energy for the FD
IT to serve multicast and secrecy unicast services to the users due to severe
channel fading conditions as the distance between PS and FD IT increases. In
addition, the energy conversion efficiency has an adverse effect on EH with
increasing distance between PS and IT. The distance between the PS and the
FD IT has been widely considered in the existing literature [1], [47]–[49].
7h =
√
KR
1+KR
hˆ +
√
1
1+KR
h˜, where hˆ is the line-of-sight (LOS)
component with ‖hˆ‖2
2
= D, h˜ is the Rayleigh fading component denoted by
h˜ ∼ CN (0, DI), and the Rician factor is set to be 3. Note that the far-field
uniform linear antenna array assumption is used to model the LOS component
[50].
from the PS is used to protect the confidential service
transmission.
2) Baseline 2: The PS provides wireless energy to the FD
IT only, thus, the AN from the PS is not generated to in-
terfere with the unsubscribed users and the eavesdropper
[31].
3) Baseline 3: We assume no energy recycling.
4) Baseline 4 [3], [37]: We assume time division multiple
access (TDMA)-based service integration.
5) Baseline 5: We assume the half-duplex (HD) mode in
the IT, where the first half of the time block is for energy
harvesting from the PS, and the remaining half time block
is used for integrated service transmission.
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Fig. 2: Secrecy-multicast performance tradeoff with perfect CSI.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Multicast rate (bps/Hz)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Se
cr
ec
y 
ra
te
 (b
ps
/H
z)
Proposed scheme
Baseline 1
Baseline 2
Baseline 3
4.5 5 5.5
3.4
3.6
3.8
4
4.2
PPS = 20 dBm
PPS = 30 dBm
Fig. 3: Secrecy-multicast performance tradeoff with different PS
transmit powers.
First, we investigate the performance tradeoff between the
secrecy rate (i.e., R¯sec) and the multicast rate R¯com achieved
based on the perfect CSI. Fig. 2 shows the secrecy rate versus
the multicast rate, which is obtained with PPS = 30 dBm.
All plots in Fig. 2 are the boundary lines of the secrecy-
multicast rate regions with different schemes. From this figure,
we observe that our proposed scheme outperforms the other
five baseline schemes in terms of the secrecy-multicast rate
performance tradeoff. In addition, we observe that baseline
1 is closer to the proposed scheme than baseline 2, which
indicates that the AN from the PS plays a more important
role to affect this performance tradeoff than the AN from the
FD IT. Moreover, it is also seen that the self-energy recycling
at the FD IT can help improve the secrecy-multicast perfor-
mance tradeoff. As expected, our proposed scheme yields a
significantly larger region than the TDMA-based region, which
demonstrates the inherent advantage of our proposed scheme
over the traditional service integration. Finally, our proposed
FD scheme has much better secrecy-multicast performance
tradeoff than the HD case, as expected.
Next, we examine the effect of the PS transmit power on the
secrecy-multicast performance tradeoff. In this simulation, we
compare our proposed scheme with baseline 1, baseline 2, and
baseline 3. Fig. 3 shows that the secrecy-multicast performance
tradeoff with different PS transmit powers. The same trends
and arguments for the secrecy-multicast performance tradeoff
from Fig. 2 can be also observed here. Furthermore, one can
observe from Fig. 3 that our proposed scheme outperforms
baseline 1, baseline 2 and baseline 3 with a lower PS transmit
power. In addition, the gap between our proposed scheme
and baseline 1 (or baseline 2) becomes smaller when PPS
decreases. This is due to the fact that the ANs (i.e., ZPS and
ZIT ) have to decrease to introduce less interference to all users
to guarantee the quality of the multicast service.
B. Imperfect CSI
Now, we present the results for the imperfect CSI case,
where we plot the performance of our proposed schemes
together with the suboptimal scheme as well as all baseline
schemes. We set ε1,k = ε2,k = εe,1 = εe,2 = ǫ without loss
of generality. Fig. 4 evaluates the worst-case secrecy-multicast
performance tradeoff with different channel uncertainties.
From this figure, it is observed that the larger the channel un-
certainties are, the more degraded worst-case secrecy-multicast
performance tradeoff we will get. In addition, we compare
our proposed scheme with the suboptimal scheme (c.f. (29)),
where the latter provides a lower bound to the former. We
also observe that the suboptimal scheme achieves a good
approximation to the global secrecy-multicast performance
tradeoff. Other observations from Fig. 4 are similar to those
drawn from Fig. 2. Specifically, the AN from the PS plays
a more significant role in improving the security-multicast
rate performance than that of the AN from FD IT. The self-
energy recycling significantly improves the secrecy-multicast
performance tradeoff. The comparison between the proposed
FD scheme and the associated HD scheme is provided in
Fig. 5, where one can observe that the proposed FD self-
energy recycling outperforms the HD scheme in terms of
the secrecy-multicast performance tradeoff. Fig. 6 shows that
the worst-case secrecy-multicast performance tradeoff with
different PS transmit powers. From this figure, the same
trends and arguments for the secrecy-multicast performance
tradeoff from Fig. 4 can be also observed here. Moreover,
with a smaller PPS , our proposed scheme exhibits a slightly
better performance than baseline 1 and baseline 2, since
both ANs (i.e., ZPS and ZIT ) must decrease to reduce the
interference introduced to the users such that the quality of the
multicast service can be guaranteed. Fig. 7 shows the worst-
case secrecy-multicast performance tradeoff versus antenna
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Fig. 4: Secrecy-multicast performance tradeoff with imperfect CSI.
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configurations with the perfect and imperfect CSI cases. From
this figure, it is observed that a larger number of transmit
antennas at the FD IT can bring a better secrecy-multicast
performance tradeoff, the same conclusion holds as the number
of the transmit antennas increases at the PS. This is due to the
fact that the receive antenna of the FD IT harvests energy sent
from the PS and self-energy recycling from signal leakage of
the transmit antenna at the FD IT.
VI. CONCLUSION
We proposed a novel secure wireless powered integrated
service scheme with FD self-energy recycling. The FD IT
collects the harvested energy from the PS and its FD self-
interference, respectively, to support the secure integrated ser-
vices, namely, the multicast and confidential unicast services.
We jointly designed the integrated service matrices and the
ANs from the PS and FD IT to maximize the achievable
secrecy rate region pair. Due to its nonconvexity, we developed
an SDP-based two-level approach to solve this optimization
problem and found the Pareto optimal points. In addition, we
extended our SMRRM problem formulation to the imperfect
CSI case, where the worst-case counterpart can be efficiently
reduced to a sequence of SDPs by employing quadratic matrix
reformulations. Moreover, we analyzed the rank characteristics
of the transmit beamforming matrices of the confidential
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Fig. 7: Secrecy-multicast performance tradeoff with different
antenna configurations.
service and the energy transfer for the perfect and imperfect
CSI cases. Simulation results were presented to demonstrate
the effectiveness of our proposed scheme showing that the ANs
and self-energy recycling can improve the secrecy-multicast
performance tradeoff. Our proposed scheme also outperforms
the traditional TDMA scheme and the HD scheme. Finally, the
suboptimal scheme can yield near-optimal performance with a
lower complexity. For future works, we will consider a more
challenging scenario where the FD IT employs a nonlinear
energy harvesting model for wireless charging and self-energy
recycling. However, the proposed scheme in this paper cannot
be straightforwardly extended to this case. This would change
the dynamic of the optimization problems and may require a
different approach.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 2
According to (17), we consider the following KKT condi-
tions,
Y − λ1h1h
H
1 = D, (30a)
DWp = 0, (30b)
D  0, (30c)
where Y = I +
∑K
k=2 λkhkh
H
k + HeXH
H
e +∑K
k=1 µkR¯
′
comhkh
H
k + δ(I − ξhSIh
H
SI) +
∑NIT
m=1 ϕmΛm. It
is easily observed that the rank of the matrix Y is a positive-
definite matrix which has full rank when I − ξhSIh
H
SI  0
must be satisfied. Thus, when I − ξhSIhHSI  0 holds,
rank(Y) = NT is satisfied such that we have the following
rank relations:
rank(Y−λ1h1h
H
1 ) ≥ rank(Y)−rank(λ1h1h
H
1 )
⇒ rank(D)≥NT−1. (31)
From (31), we can claim that the rank of D is either NT or
NT − 1. If rank(D) = NT , Wp = 0 from (30b). However, if
Wp = 0, it violates our assumption. Thus, rank(D) = NT−1,
which satisfies (30b) only when Wp lies in the null space of
D whose dimension is one. The first claim in Theorem 2 has
been proved.
Now let us focus on the second claim to show that the
energy beamforming matrix V is also rank-one. First, we
consider the following KKT conditions:
γI+
NPS∑
n=1
̺nΞn −M = A, (32a)
AV = 0, (32b)
A  0, δ ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0, (32c)
where M = δξhhH  0, which is a Hermitian matrix.
From (32c), the matrix A = γI +
∑NPS
n=1 ̺nΞn −M  0,
ψmax ≥ κ ≥ 0 holds, where ψmax and κ are the real-valued
maximum eigenvalues of the matrices γI+
∑NPS
n=1 ̺nΞn and
M, respectively. Considering the KKT condition (32b), we
can show that if ψmax > κ, the matrix A is positive definite
and full-rank. However, this will lead to the optimal solution
V = 0 which contradicts our assumption. Thus, to satisfy
the complementary slackness condition (32b), we can claim
that either Vopt = 0 or rank(Vopt) ≤ 1 holds at the optimal
solution.8
Thus, the dual variable ψmax has to be equal to the
eigenvalue of M, i.e., ψmax = κ. In order to have a bounded
optimal dual solution, it follows that the null space of A is
spanned by a vector p, which is the unit-norm eigenvector of
M associated with the eigenvalue κ. As a result, we can claim
that rank(A) ≥ NPS − 1. Thus, rank(V) ≤ 1 holds.
B. Proof of Theorem 3
First, it is verified that problem (15) is jointly convex in
terms of the primal variables (i.e., V, ZPS , W0, Wp, ZIT )
and satisfies the Slater’s condition [41]. Thus, the gap between
the primal and dual optimization problems is zero. According
to (17), the dual optimization problem is given by
max
λk,µk,δ,γ,̺n,ϕm≥0
A,B,C,D,F,X0
min
V,ZPS0
W0,Wp,ZIT0
L(Ω), (33)
which achieves the same objective value with its relative
primal optimization problem (15). By exploiting the dual
problem (33), we obtain the primal and dual optimal solu-
tion of (15) and (33), denoted as, (V∗,Z∗PS ,W
∗
0,W
∗
p,Z
∗
IT )
8When Vopt = 0, it follows that the IT has sufficient stored energy and
does not need to be wirelessly charged, the FD energy recycle and the AN
(i.e., ZPS) from the PS are employed to support secure integrated service
transmission.
and (λ∗k, µ
∗
k, δ
∗, γ∗, ̺∗n, ϕ
∗
m,A
∗,B∗,C∗,D∗,F∗,X∗), respec-
tively. From (30a), we can claim that the rank of matrix Y∗
is indeterminate. Hence, two scenarios are discussed in the
following. Let us denote rank(Y) = r. First, we consider the
case that r = NT , which implies that Y is a full-rank matrix,
such that we can easily show that the optimal solution Wp is
rank-one (c.f. Proof of Theorem 2). Additionally, the optimal
solution of the confidential service matrixW∗p is expressed as
W∗p = c0q0q
H
0 , where c0 > 0 is a constant and q0 ∈ C
NIT×1
spans the null space of D∗.
Next, we investigate the case r < NT , which implies that
the matrix Y is not full-rank. In this case, we exploit the
structure of W∗p by constructing a new solution for problem
(15) with rank(W∗p) = 1. It is assumed that Θ ∈ C
NT×NT−r
with ΘHΘ = I contains the orthonormal basis vector of the
null space of Y, i.e., YΘ = 0, and rank(Θ) = NT − r.
Denote by qn ∈ CNT×1, 1 ≤ n ≤ NT − r the n-th column
of Θ. Then, we have qHn Dqn = q
H
n (Y − λ1h1h
H
1 )qn =
−λ1|hH1 qn|
2, 1 ≤ n ≤ NT−r. Due to the constraint (16) and
the KKT condition (30c), we have λ1 > 0 andD  0 such that
h1h
H
1 Θ = 0. Thus, we have DΘ = (Y − λ1h1h
H
1 )Θ = 0.
Additionally, from (30a), we have rank(D) ≥ rank(Y) −
rank(λ1h1h
H
1 ) = r − 1. Moreover, since rank(Θ) = NT − r,
it follows that rank(D) ≤ r. Thus, we can conclude that
NT−r ≤ rank(W∗p) ≤ NT−r+1 due to (30b). Now, suppose
that rank(Wp) = rank(Θ) = NT −r, then we haveWp = Θ.
From (30b) and (30c), the optimal solution of the confidential
service matrixW∗p can be written asW
∗
p =
∑NT−r
n=1 dnqnq
H
n ,
where dn > 0, ∀n. However, this case implies that no
confidential service has been ordered by user 1 due to the fact
that each qn lies in the null space of h1. Hence, it follows
that rank(Wp) = NT − r+1, and there exists only one single
subspace spanned by q0 ∈ CNT×1 of unit norm, which lies in
the null space of D, i.e., Dq0 = 0, and is orthogonal to the
span of Θ, i.e., ΘHq0 = 0. Thus, we obtain the structure of
the confidential service optimal solution asW∗p = [Θ q0], and
rank(W∗p) = NT −r+1. We can express the optimal solution
of problem (15) as W∗p =
∑NT−r
n=1 dnqnq
H
n + c0q0q
H
0 . Sup-
pose that (V∗,Z∗PS ,W
∗
0, W
∗
p, Z
∗
IT ) is the optimal solution
to problem (15) with rank(Woptp ) > 1, we can reconstruct a
new solution (V˜∗, Z˜∗PS ,W˜
∗
0,W˜
∗
p, Z˜
∗
IT ) given by
W˜∗p =W
∗
p −
NT−r∑
n=1
dnqnq
H
n = c0q0q0, (34a)
Z˜∗IT = Z
∗
IT +
NT−r∑
n=1
dnqnq
H
n , W˜
∗
0 =W
∗
0,
V˜∗ = V∗, Z˜∗PS = Z
∗
PS . (34b)
We substitute the new optimal solutions in (34) into the objec-
tive function and all constraints in (15), it can be observed that
the reconstructed solution is also feasible for problem (15) and
achieves the same optimal value as (V∗,Z∗PS ,W
∗
0,W
∗
p,Z
∗
IT )
such that rank(W¯p) = 1 (c.f. (34a)).
C. Proof of Theorem 4
First, we define
f1(Wp,ZIT ,ZPS)
= min
h1∈S1,1
g1∈S2,1
hH1 (Wp+ZIT )h1+g
H
1 ZPSg1+σ
2
1
α2(hH1 ZITh1+g
H
1 ZPSg1+σ
2
1)
. (35)
If we show that (28) is a quasi-convex, then we need to show
that f1 is a quasi-concave function on the problem domain
in (28), which will be our focus in the remaining part of
this proof. With the convexity of the problem domain in (28)
established, we should check whether all the α˜-superlevel sets
of f1 are convex for every α˜ [41]. The α˜-superlevel set of
f1 is defined as Sα˜ = {(Wp,ZIT ,ZPS)|Wp  0,ZIT 
0,ZPS  0, f1 ≥ α˜}. Next, we reveal the convexity of f1 ≥ α˜
by resorting to the S-Procedure and [46, Theorem 3.5], (28a)
is reformulated as the following LMI:

β¯1INIT +D1 D1h¯1 0NIT×NPS
h¯H1 D1 t1 g¯
H
1 D2
0NPS×NIT D2g¯1 D2 +
θ¯1
ε2
2,1
INPS

  0, (36)
where β¯1 ≥ 0, θ¯1 ≥ 0, D1 = Wp + (1 − α˜α2)ZIT ,
D2 = (1 − α˜α2)ZPS , and t1 = h¯H1 D1h¯1 + g¯
H
1 D2g¯1 + (1−
α˜α2)σ
2
1 − β¯1ε
2
1,1 − θ¯1. The LMI (36) is convex in terms of
(Wp,ZIT ,ZPS , β¯1, θ¯1). Hence, Sα˜ is a convex set for every
α˜, and we conclude that f1 is a quasi-concave function.
D. Proof of Theorem 5
Let g
opt
wc(R¯com,wc, α2) be the optimal objective function
value of (28). Similar to Section III-B, we consider the
following power minimization problem (37) on the top of the
next page, where s¯0,k = −R¯
′
com,wcσ
2
k − λ¯kε
2
1,k − γ¯k, t¯0,k =
(α2 − 1)σ2k − β¯kε
2
1,k − θ¯k, t¯1 =
[
1− goptwc(R¯
′
com,wc, α2)α2
]
σ21− β¯1ε
2
1,1− θ¯1, R1 =Wp+(1−g
opt
wc(R¯
′
com,wc, α2)α2)ZIT ,
R2 = (1 − g
opt
wc(R¯
′
com,wc, α2)α2)ZPS , also,
S0,k=

 λ¯kINIT 0NIT×1 0NIT×NPS01×NIT s¯0,k 01×NPS
0NPS×NIT 0NPS×1
γ¯k
ε2
2,k
INPS

, ∀k∈K,
T0,k=


β¯kINIT 0NIT×1 0NIT×NPS
01×NIT t¯0,k 01×NPS
0NPS×NIT 0NPS×1
θ¯k
ε2
2,k
INPS

, ∀k∈K¯,
T0,e =


δ¯e
ε2
1,e
INIT 0NIT×NE 0NIT×NPS
0NE×NIT [(α2−1)σ
2
e−δ¯e−η¯e]INE 0NE×NPS
0NPS×NIT 0NPS×NE
η¯e
ε2
2,e
INPS

 ,
T0,1=


β¯1INIT 0NIT×1 0NIT×NPS
01×NIT t¯1 01×NPS
0NPS×NIT 0NPS×1
θ¯1
ε2
2,1
INPS

 ,
Hˆk=
[
INIT h¯k 0NIT×NPS
]
,
Gˆk=
[
0NPS×NIT g¯k INPS
]
, ∀k ∈ K.
We can claim that (37) shares the same optimal
solution with (28). Consequently, we investigate the
Lagrange dual function of (37), which is written
min
V,ZPS ,W0,Wp,ZIT
λ¯k,γ¯k,β¯k,θ¯k,δ¯e,η¯e
Tr(W0+Wp+ZIT ), s.t.(5a), (5b), (6a), (6b), (5e), {λ¯k, γ¯k, β¯k, θ¯k, δ¯e, η¯e}≥0, ∀k∈K,
S0,k + Hˆ
H
k [W0 − R¯
′
com,wc(Wp + ZIT )]Hˆk − Gˆ
H
k (Rˆ
′
com,wcZPS)Gˆk  0, ∀k ∈ K, (37a)
T0,k − Hˆ
H
k B¯1Hˆk + Gˆ
H
k B¯2Gˆk  0, ∀k ∈ K¯, T0,e + Hˆ
H
e C¯1Hˆe + Gˆ
H
e C¯2Gˆe  0, (37b)
T0,1+Hˆ
H
1 R1Hˆ1+Gˆ
H
1 R2Gˆ10, (37c)
L(Ω2)=Tr(W0)+Tr(Wp)+Tr(ZIT )−Tr(AV)−Tr(BZPS)−Tr(CW0)−Tr(DWp)−Tr(FZIT )
+δ
[
Tr[(I−ξhSIh
H
SI)(W0+Wp+ZIT )]−PIT−ξTr[hh
H(V+ZPS)]
]
+γ [Tr(V+ZPS)−PPS]
+
NPS∑
n=1
̺n [Tr[Ξn(V+ZPS)]−p
n
PS ]+
NIT∑
m=1
ϕm [Tr[Λm(W0+Wp+ZIT )]−p
m
IT ]−
K∑
k=1
Tr [Xk (S0,k
+HˆHk A¯1Hˆk−Gˆ
H
k A¯2Gˆk
)]
−
K∑
k=2
Tr
[
Yk
(
T0,k−Hˆ
H
k B¯1Hˆk+Gˆ
H
k B¯2Gˆk
)]
−Tr [Ye (Te
+HˆHe C¯1Hˆe+Gˆ
H
e C¯2Gˆe
)]
−Tr
[
Y1
(
T0,1+Hˆ
H
1 R1Hˆ1+Gˆ
H
1 R2Gˆ1
)]
. (38)
as (38) on the top of the this page, where Ω2 =
{V,ZPS ,W0,Wp,ZIT ,A,B,C,D,F, δ, γ, ̺n, ϕm,Xk,Yk,Ye},
A  0, B  0, C  0, D  0, F  0, Xk  0, Yk  0,
Ye  0, δ ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0, ̺n ≥ 0, and ϕm ≥ 0 are dual
variables pertaining to the primary constraints in (37). To
proceed, we consider the following KKT conditions:
D = Y − Hˆ1Y1Hˆ
H
1 , (39a)
DWp = 0, (39b)
Y1
(
T0,1+Hˆ
H
1 R1Hˆ1+Gˆ
H
1 R2Gˆ1
)
= 0, (39c)
where Y = I + δ(I − ξhSIhHSI) +
∑NIT
m=1 ϕmΛm +∑K
k=1 HˆkXkHˆ
H
k +
∑K
k=2 HˆkYkHˆ
H
k + HˆeYeHˆ
H
e . Postmul-
tiplying (39a) by Wp and applying (39b) yields YWp =
Hˆ1Y1Hˆ
H
1 Wp. It is shown thatY ≻ 0 when I−ξhSIh
H
SI  0
holds. Thus, we have the following rank relations
rank(Wp)= rank(Hˆ1Y1Hˆ
H
1 Wp)≤ rank(Hˆ1Y1Hˆ
H
1 ). (40)
Thus, the remaining part of this proof is to focus on the rank
of Hˆ1Y1Hˆ
H
1 . We premultiply and postmultiply (39c) by Hˆ1
and Hˆ =
[
INIT 0NIT×1 0NIT×NPS
]H
, respectively, to get
Hˆ1Y1T0,1Hˆ+Hˆ1Y1Hˆ
H
1 R1Hˆ1Hˆ
+Hˆ1Y1Gˆ
H
1 R2Gˆ1Hˆ=0NIT×NIT , (41)
where R1 = Wp + (1 − g
opt
wc(R¯
′
com,wc, α2)α2)ZIT , and
R2 = (1−g
opt
wc(R¯
′
com,wc, α2)α2)ZPS . To exploit the rank of
Hˆ1Y1Hˆ
H
1 , we consider the following equalities
T0,1Hˆ= β¯1
(
HˆH1 −hˆ
H
1
)
, Hˆ1Hˆ=INIT , G¯1Hˆ=0NPS×NIT ,
(42)
where hˆ1 =
[
0NIT h¯1 0NIT×NPS
]
. Substituting (42) into
(41) yields Hˆ1Y1Hˆ
H
1 (R1 + β¯1INIT ) = β¯1Hˆ1Y1hˆ
H
1 . It is
easily verified that R1 + β¯1INIT is a positive semidefinite
matrix and nonsingular, thus, pre or postmultiplying by a
nonsingular matrix does not affect the matrix rank. The
following rank relation holds,
rank(Hˆ1Y1Hˆ
H
1 )= rank(Hˆ1Y1Hˆ
H
1 (R1+β¯1INIT ))
= rank
(
β¯1Hˆ1Y1hˆ
H
1
)
≤ rank
(
hˆH1
)
≤1. (43)
With the relations (40) and (43), we obtain rank(Wp) ≤
rank(Hˆ1Y1Hˆ
H
1 ) ≤ 1. We have either Wp = 0 or
rank(Wp) = 1. Suppose that Wp = 0, which implies that
user 1 does not subscribe to the confidential service. Thus,
we obtain rank(Wp) = 1. Additionally, following the same
procedures in the proof of the second part in Theorem 2, we
can show that the energy beamforming matrix yields a rank-
one solution.
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